The ACLU on the FBI vs Apple encryption backdoor:
If this generally useful security feature is actually no threat to the FBI, why is it painting it in such a scary light that some commentators have even called it a “doomsday mechanism”? The FBI wants us to think that this case is about a single phone, used by a terrorist. But it's a power grab: law enforcement has dozens of other cases where they would love to be able to compel software and hardware providers to build, provide, and vouch for deliberately weakened code. The FBI wants to weaken the ecosystem we all depend on for maintenance of our all-too-vulnerable devices. If they win, future software updates will present users with a troubling dilemma. When we're asked to install a software update, we won’t know whether it was compelled by a government agency (foreign or domestic), or whether it truly represents the best engineering our chosen platform has to offer.
In short, they're asking the public to grant them significant new powers that could put all of our communications infrastructure at risk, and to trust them to not misuse these powers. But they're deliberately misleading the public (and the judiciary) to try to gain these powers. This is not how a trustworthy agency operates. We should not be fooled.
Possibly the most worrying thing about this mess is how blatant the FBI and other law enforcement agencies have been about trying to set this precedent. They almost aren’t even bothering to pretend that it is, indeed, about all phones, not just this one.
And again, use my Worst Enemy Test: If you had to permit your worst enemy access to these powers, would you still support the legislation?
I suspect Director Comey wouldn’t be okay with his political opponents being able to compel Apple or Google to create their own backdoors to bypass the encryption on his phone. Would anyone be happy about President Trump having “sooper sekrit” access to anyone’s information?